Publication: Theory, Practice, and Non-Reductive (Meta)Science
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Date
2018
Authors
Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme
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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2018.1552097
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
Are the theoretical frameworks of phenomenology and of science compatible? And, if so, what would a reconciliation entail for science as it is practiced? Shaun Gallagher poses these two questions, answering the first in the affirmative and leaving the second unaddressed. I argue that treating the two as separate questions presupposes an inadequate distinction between theory and practice that Gallagher’s non-reductive framework motivates rejecting. Recognizing the intertwining of theory and practice allows us to answer Gallagher’s two questions about phenomenology and science all at once, but it also motivates a less conciliatory conclusion than the one he offers.
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Citation
Sanches de Oliveira, G. (2018). Theory, Practice, and Non-reductive (Meta)Science. Australasian Philosophical Review, 2(2), 199–203. https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2018.1552097
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