Browsing by Subject "Embodiment"
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- PublicationOpen AccessAdding and subtracting by hand: Metaphorical representations of arithmetic in spontaneous co-speech gesturesAlibali, M. W.; Valenzuela Manzanares, J.; Alcaraz Carrión, Daniel; Filología InglesaThis study investigated the spontaneous co-speech gestures produced by speakers who were talking about the concepts of addition and subtraction in a television news setting. We performed a linguistic and co-speech gesture analysis of expressions related to the concepts of addition (N plus N, addition, add) and subtraction (Nminus N, subtraction, subtract). First, we compared the linguistic frequency of these structures across several corpora. Second, we performed a multimodal gesture analysis, drawing data from a television news repository. We analyzed 423 co-speech gestures (169 for subtraction and 254 for addition) in terms of their axis (e.g., lateral, sagittal) and their direction (e.g., leftwards, away from their body). Third, we examined the semantic properties of the direct object that was added or subtracted. There were two main findings. First, low-frequency linguistic expressions were more likely to be accompanied by co-speech gestures. Second, most gestures about addition and subtraction were produced along the lateral or sagittal axes. When people spoke about addition, they tended to produce lateral, rightwards movements or movements away from the body. When people spoke about subtraction, they tended to produce lateral, leftwards movements or movements towards the body. This co-speech gesture data provides evidence that people activate two different metaphors for arithmetic in spontaneous behavior: ARITHMETIC IS MOTION ALONG A PATH and ARITHMETIC IS COLLECTING OBJECTS.
- PublicationOpen AccessLa base corpórea de nuestros estados mentales: corporeidad basal y relacional(Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones, 2025) Castro, Rafa; Sin departamento asociadoEn el presente estudio proponemos distinguir dos teorías corpóreas dentro de la enfoque cognitivo de la metáfora: la corporeidad basal y relacional. La corporeidad basal es una teoría que trabaja con lo que la teoría cognitiva de la metáfora ha denominado “base corpórea”. La base corpórea, compuesta por las imágenes esquema y las metáforas primarias, es el conjunto de estados mentales prácticamente universales cuyo origen se debe a una relación directa con la experiencia corpórea. Al contrario, la corporeidad relacional pretende elucidar los mecanismos de composición y proyección que aseguran una cadena causal desde la base corpórea hasta el resto de estados mentales. Asimismo, examinaremos con mayor detalle ambas teorías mediante el análisis de la base corpórea, noción crucial para el desarrollo de la corporeidad basal y relacional.
- PublicationOpen AccessBee-ing In the World: Phenomenology, Cognitive Science, and Interactivity in a Novel Insect-Tracking Task(Cognitive Science Society, 2019) Riehm, Christopher; Annand, Colin T.; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; FilosofíaDotov, Nie and Chemero (2010) conducted a set of experiments to demonstrate how phenomenology, particularly the work of Martin Heidegger, interfaces with experimental research in embodied cognitive science. Specifically, they drew a parallel between Heidegger’s notion of readiness-to-hand and the concept of an extended cognitive system (Clark 2008) by looking for the presence or absence of interaction-dominant dynamics (Holden, van Orden, and Turvey 2009; Ihlen and Vereijken 2010) in a hand/mouse system. We share Dotov, Nie and Chemero’s optimism about the potential for cross-pollination between phenomenology and cognitive science, but we think that it can be better advanced through a shift in focus. First, we argue in favor of using Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory as the philosophical foundation for experimental research in embodied cognitive science. Second, we describe an audio-visual tracking task in virtual reality that we designed and used to empirically investigate humanenvironment coupling and interactivity. In addition to providing further support for phenomenologically-inspired empirical cognitive science, our research also offers a more generalizable scientific treatment of the interaction between humans and their environments.
- PublicationOpen AccessFrom Kepler to Gibson(Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge, 2017-04-13) Raja Galián, Vicente; Biener, Zvi; Chemero, Anthony; FilosofíaWe will argue that the idea of embodiment and the strategies for carrying out embodied approaches are some of the most prevalent and interdisciplinary legacies of early modern science. The idea of embodiment is simple: to explain the behavior of bodies, we must understand them as unified wholes in their environments. Embodied approaches eschew explanations in terms of qualitative descriptions of the intrinsic properties of bodies and promote explanation in terms of the interaction between bodies. This idea can be found in Kepler’s optics, Descartes’s physics, and Newton’s physico-mathematics. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems is the culmination of this centuries-long embodiment movement which can be traced back to the seventeenth century.
- PublicationOpen AccessOn defining image schemas(Cambridge University Press (CUP), ) Mandler, Jean; Pagán Cánovas, Cristóbal; Filología InglesaIn this theoretical paper we propose three diff erent kinds of cognitive structure that have not been diff erentiated in the psychological and cognitive linguistic literatures. They are spatial primitives , image schemas , and schematic integrations . Spatial primitives are the fi rst conceptual building blocks formed in infancy, image schemas are simple spatial stories built from them, and schematic integrations use the fi rst two types to build concepts that include non-spatial elements, such as force and emotion. These diff erent kinds of structure have all come under the umbrella term of ‘image schemas’. However, they diff er in their content, developmental origin, imageability, and role in meaning construction in language and in thought. The present paper indicates how preverbal conceptualization needs to be taken into account for a complete understanding of image schemas and their uses. It provides examples to illustrate this infl uence, the most important of these being the primacy of imageable spatial information.
- PublicationOpen AccessEl problema de la causalidad: metáfora conceptual, significados corporizados, conocimiento de mundo y procesamiento psicolingüístico(2018-02-27) Mariel Zunino, GabrielaEste trabajo intenta introducir algunas cuestiones en relación con el problema de la causalidad como concepto básico de la cognición humana y como relación estructurante de los discursos. (...)
- PublicationOpen AccessThe strong program in embodied cognitive science(Springer, 2023) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; FilosofíaA popular trend in the sciences of the mind is to understand cognition as embodied, embedded, enactive, ecological, and so on. While some of the work under the label of “embodied cognition” takes for granted key commitments of traditional cognitive science, other projects coincide in treating embodiment as the starting point for an entirely different way of investigating all of cognition. Focusing on the latter, this paper discusses how embodied cognitive science can be made more reflexive and more sensitive to the implications that our views of cognition have for how we understand scientific practice, including our own theorizing about cognition. Inspired by the “strong programme” in the sociology of scientific knowledge, I explore the prospect of an analogously “strong” program in embodied cognitive science. I first draw from Dewey’s transactional notion of “situation” to identify a broad sense in which embodied cognitive science takes cognition, as an embodied phenomenon, to be situated. I then sketch a perspective I call situated reflexivity, which extends the Deweyan analysis to understand scientific practice in the same terms, and thereby illustrates what research in line with a strong program in embodied cognitive science can look like. This move, I propose, has the potential of setting up a new inquiry situation that makes more salient the embodiment of scientific practice and that, through this, can help organize our own embodied cognitive activities as we try to make sense of scientific work, including our own.
- PublicationOpen AccessTheory, Practice, and Non-Reductive (Meta)Science(Taylor & Francis, 2018) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; FilosofíaAre the theoretical frameworks of phenomenology and of science compatible? And, if so, what would a reconciliation entail for science as it is practiced? Shaun Gallagher poses these two questions, answering the first in the affirmative and leaving the second unaddressed. I argue that treating the two as separate questions presupposes an inadequate distinction between theory and practice that Gallagher’s non-reductive framework motivates rejecting. Recognizing the intertwining of theory and practice allows us to answer Gallagher’s two questions about phenomenology and science all at once, but it also motivates a less conciliatory conclusion than the one he offers.
- PublicationOpen AccessUn negro no es un negro. Apariencia y aparecer en la fenomenología de la corporalidad de Fanon(Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones, 2026) Cordero-Pedrosa, Carlos; Sin departamento asociadoEste artículo analiza la fenomenología de la corporalidad en Frantz Fanon, demostrando su centralidad para entender la construcción del cuerpo racializado, la subjetividad colonial, el racismo como forma de dominación, y las posibilidades emancipatorias. A través de conceptos como el esquema epidérmico y el esquema histórico-racial, Fanon sitúa en el contexto histórico del colonialismo y politiza la fenomenología de Merleau-Ponty. De esta manera muestra cómo el racismo reduce al sujeto negro a su cuerpo y cómo limita sus posibilidades de acción. La fenomenología de la corporalidad no se ocupa únicamente de la apariencia, sino que se ocupa de cómo las historias y las practicas del colonialismo moldean los cuerpos al crear las condiciones para limitar el aparecer de ciertos cuerpos y facilitar el de otros. En el marco del racismo, el aparecer, el traspasar los límites impuestos se convierte en violencia. La violencia emerge en el propio acto afirmativo; descolonizar es, en sí mismo, un fenómeno violento porque desafía el orden colonial. El artículo se estructura en tres ejes: 1) la producción social del cuerpo del negro, 2) el enfoque sociogénico como herramienta para estudiar su constitución histórica, y 3) la paradoja del cuerpo locus de alienación racista y desalienación.