Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme

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Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme

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Filosofía

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Open Access
Two species of realism
(Springer, 2024-07-26) Raja Galián, Vicente; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
Different species of realism have been proposed in the scientific and philosophical literature. Two of these species are direct realism and causal pattern realism. Direct realism is a form of perceptual realism proposed by ecological psychologists within cognitive science. Causal pattern realism has been proposed within the philosophy of model-based science. Both species are able to accommodate some of the main tenets and motivations of instrumentalism. The main aim of this paper is to explore the conceptual moves that make both direct realism and causal pattern realism tenable realist positions able to accommodate an instrumentalist stance. Such conceptual moves are (i) the rejection of veritism and (ii) the re-structuring of the phenomena of interest. We will then show that these conceptual moves are instances of the ones of a common realist genus we name pragmatist realism.
Open Access
Pragmatism
(Springer - Palgrave Macmillan, 2022-04-14) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
Pragmatism is a school of thought popularized in the beginning of the twentieth century by American psychologist and philosopher William James. Although most widely known (and criticized) for its theory of truth, pragmatism is a far broader position, connecting to issues in psychology, education, ethics, religion, and politics. This entry gives an overview of pragmatism particularly as developed by James. It begins by describing pragmatism’s historical development and presenting the pragmatist contribution to philosophical debates about truth. From this, the entry moves to discussing pragmatism’s broader significance, and it does so by highlighting how pragmatism’s emphasis on practical effects relates to cognitive and existential possibilities: Our habits both limit and enable the range of behaviors available to us, but they can also be worked on so as to bring us closer to better possibilities, including possibilities for our own personal development and for making life more meaningful, as well as possibilities for how we approach life in society.
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Experimentation, “models” and the turn to practice
(Springer, 2020-09-08) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
Review of Isabelle F. Peschard and Bas C. Van Fraassen (Eds.): The experimental side of modeling. University of Minnesota Press, 2018, 336pp, $40 PB
Open Access
The embodiment of architectural experience: a methodological perspective on neuro-architecture
(Frontiers Media, 2022-05-09) Wang, Sheng; Djebbara, Zakaria; Gramann, Klaus; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
People spend a large portion of their time inside built environments. Research in neuro-architecture—the neural basis of human perception of and interaction with the surrounding architecture—promises to advance our understanding of the cognitive processes underlying this common human experience and also to inspire evidence-based architectural design principles. This paper examines the current state of the field and offers a path for moving closer to fulfilling this promise. The paper is structured in three sections, beginning with an introduction to neuro-architecture, outlining its main objectives and giving an overview of experimental research in the field. Afterward, two methodological limitations attending current brain-imaging architectural research are discussed: the first concerns the limited focus of the research, which is often restricted to the aesthetic dimension of architectural experience; the second concerns practical limitations imposed by the typical experimental tools and methods, which often require participants to remain stationary and prevent naturalistic interaction with architectural surroundings. Next, we propose that the theoretical basis of ecological psychology provides a framework for addressing these limitations and motivates emphasizing the role of embodied exploration in architectural experience, which encompasses but is not limited to aesthetic contemplation. In this section, some basic concepts within ecological psychology and their convergences with architecture are described. Lastly, we introduce Mobile Brain/Body Imaging (MoBI) as one emerging brain imaging approach with the potential to improve the ecological validity of neuro-architecture research. Accordingly, we suggest that combining theoretical and conceptual resources from ecological psychology with state-of-the-art neuroscience methods (Mobile Brain/Body Imaging) is a promising way to bring neuro-architecture closer to accomplishing its scientific and practical goals.
Open Access
Model-based science: diverse perspectives, little cross-disciplinary dialogue
(Springer, 2018) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Sin departamento asociado
Review of Lorenzo Magnani and Tommaso Bertolotti (Editors): Springer handbook of model-based science. Dordrecht: Springer, 2017, 1179pp.
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Review of A. C. Grayling’s “The Age of Genius: The Seventeenth Century and the Birth of the Modern Mind”
(Metapsychology Online Reviews, 2016) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
Open Access
The Cognition-Perception Distinction Across Paradigms: An Ecological View
(Cognitive Science Society, 2018) Raja Galián, Vicente; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
Folk psychology takes perception and cognition to be two distinct processes. It seems that when we perceive the world we are engaged in one kind of activity and when we think about it we are engaged in a different one. This conception underlies various discussions within the cognitive sciences, such as on the architecture and modularity of the mind, and the cognitive penetrability of perception. But is the distinction justified? This paper looks for an answer in two opposing paradigms in the sciences of the mind: traditional cognitivism and ecological psychology. Even though cognitivism is the dominant paradigm, we argue that it has thus far failed to give a definite account of the relation between perception and cognition, and to support or to deny their separation. Ecological psychology, on the other hand, rejects the distinction and integrates cognition with perception. We discuss previous work within the ecological view and sketch directions for future research.
Open Access
Scientific practice as ecological-enactive co-construction
(Springer, 2023-06-22) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; van Es, Thomas; Hipolito, Ines; Filosofía
Philosophy of science has undergone a naturalistic turn, moving away from traditional idealized concerns with the logical structure of scientific theories and toward focusing on real-world scientific practice, especially in domains such as modeling and experimentation. As part of this shift, recent work has explored how the project of philosophically understanding science as a natural phenomenon can be enriched by drawing from different fields and disciplines, including niche construction theory in evolutionary biology, on the one hand, and ecological and enactive views in embodied cognitive science, on the other. But these insights have so far been explored in separation from each other, without clear indication of whether they can work together. Moreover, the focus on particular practices, however insightful, has tended to lack consideration of potential further implications for a naturalized understanding of science as a whole (i.e., above and beyond those particular practices). Motivated by these developments, here we sketch a broad-ranging view of science, scientific practice and scientific knowledge in terms of ecological-enactive co-construction. The view we propose situates science in the biological, evolutionary context of human embodied cognitive activity aimed at addressing the demands of life. This motivates reframing theory as practice, and reconceptualizing scientific knowledge in ecological terms, as relational and world-involving. Our view also brings to the forefront of attention the fundamental link between ideas about the nature of mind, of science and of nature itself, which we explore by outlining how our proposal differs from more conservative, and narrower, conceptions of “cognitive niche construction.”
Open Access
Review of "Inference and Representation: A Study in Modeling Science"
(Cambridge University Press; Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2025) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
Review of Mauricio Suárez (2024) Inference and Representation: A Study in Modeling Science. University of Chicago Press
Open Access
Emotion as a form of perception: why William James was not a Jamesian
(Cognitive Science Society, 2018) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
Two main views have informed the literature on the psychology of emotion in the past few decades. On one side, cognitivists identify emotions with processes such as judgments, evaluations and appraisals. On the other side, advocates of non-cognitive approaches leave the “intellectual” aspects of emotional experience out of the emotion itself, instead identifying emotions with embodied processes involving physiological changes. Virtually everyone on either side of the cognitive/non-cognitive divide identify William James’ view, also known as the James-Lange theory, fully on the noncognitivist side. But this is a mistake. Re-interpreting James’ writings in its scientific context, this paper argues that he actually rejected the cognitive/non-cognitive divide, such that his view of emotions did not fit either side—that is, James was not a “Jamesian” in the sense the term is used in the literature.