Publication: Deber de asistencia del administrador a la Junta General (Sentencia núm. 255 /2016, de 19 de abril, del Tribunal Supremo [RJ, 2016, 3848])
Authors
Sánchez Hernández, Raquel
item.page.secondaryauthor
item.page.director
Publisher
Aranzadi
publication.page.editor
publication.page.department
DOI
item.page.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
Ante el imperativo deber de asistencia de los administradores a las juntas generales regulado en el art. 180 LCS y la falta de una expresa consecuencia ligada directamente a su posible incumplimiento, la Sala de lo Civil del Tribunal Supremo ha determinado en su Sentencia núm. 255/2016, de 19 de abril (RJ 2016, 3848) que, como regla general, la ausencia de los administradores sociales no puede ser considerada como causa de suspensión o nulidad de la junta general, afirmando no obstante que esta regla general puede tener excepciones –como sucede en el supuesto enjuiciado– pues sí podría llevar aparejada tales consecuencias cuando dicha ausencia sea decisiva para la privación de algunos de los derechos de los socios que, precisamente, se ven satisfechos a través de la celebración de la junta.
Siendo ésta la cuestión central sobre la que descansa el presente comentario, apuntaremos también dos cuestiones que adicionalmente son objeto de análisis por el Tribunal Supremo en la referida Sentencia, en particular, el carácter de la junta general que fue objeto de impugnación con la correlativa enumeración de los requisitos que deben reunir las juntas generales universales para su correcta constitución y la imposibilidad de que los administradores sociales asistan a la junta por representación.
En último lugar, se apuntarán algunas reflexiones respecto a la posible incidencia que podrían tener las reformas introducidas por la Ley 31/2014, de 3 de diciembre, por la que se modifica la Ley de Sociedades de Capital para la mejora del gobierno
corporativo (RCL 2014, 1613) en lo que respecta a las consecuencias de la falta de asistencia del administrador a las juntas generales.
Considering the imperative duty of the directors to attend general meetings regulated in section 180 of Spanish Corporate Enterprises Act (Ley de Sociedades de Capital ), and the lack of a specific consequences directly linked to the possibility of failing to comply with said duty, the Spanish Civil Division of the Supreme Court, in Sentence No. 255/2016 19th April (RJ 2016, 3848), has determined that, as a general rule, the absence of the Directors cannot be considered as cause for suspension or nullity of the general meeting. However, it has also confirmed that there can be exceptions to this general rule –as in the hypothesis analyzed in the Sentence– since it can carry with it consequences when said absence is decisive to the deprivation of the partner’s rights, which, as a matter of fact, are fulfilled through the meetings. Since this is the matter in which this text is based, we will also discuss two issues that are additionally analyzed by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned Sentence, specifically, the nature of the general meeting which was subject to the objection and the corresponding listing of the requirements that universal general meetings must fulfill in order to achieve its correct constitution and the impossibility that corporate Directors attend meetings through representation. Finally, some considerations regarding the possible effect of the amends in Act 31/2014 of 3rd December modifying the Spanish Corporate Enterprises Act for the improvement of corporate administration (RCL 2014, 1613) with regard to the consequences of the lack of the Directors’ attendance to general meetings will be addressed
Considering the imperative duty of the directors to attend general meetings regulated in section 180 of Spanish Corporate Enterprises Act (Ley de Sociedades de Capital ), and the lack of a specific consequences directly linked to the possibility of failing to comply with said duty, the Spanish Civil Division of the Supreme Court, in Sentence No. 255/2016 19th April (RJ 2016, 3848), has determined that, as a general rule, the absence of the Directors cannot be considered as cause for suspension or nullity of the general meeting. However, it has also confirmed that there can be exceptions to this general rule –as in the hypothesis analyzed in the Sentence– since it can carry with it consequences when said absence is decisive to the deprivation of the partner’s rights, which, as a matter of fact, are fulfilled through the meetings. Since this is the matter in which this text is based, we will also discuss two issues that are additionally analyzed by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned Sentence, specifically, the nature of the general meeting which was subject to the objection and the corresponding listing of the requirements that universal general meetings must fulfill in order to achieve its correct constitution and the impossibility that corporate Directors attend meetings through representation. Finally, some considerations regarding the possible effect of the amends in Act 31/2014 of 3rd December modifying the Spanish Corporate Enterprises Act for the improvement of corporate administration (RCL 2014, 1613) with regard to the consequences of the lack of the Directors’ attendance to general meetings will be addressed
publication.page.subject
Citation
Revista de Derecho de Sociedades(2017), Núm. 49 (Enero-Abril),281-298.
item.page.embargo
31-jul-2026
Collections
Ir a Estadísticas
Este ítem está sujeto a una licencia Creative Commons. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/