Publication:
Exactly why are slurs wrong?

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Daimon_84_2021_2.pdf(184.88 KB)
Date
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Authors
Thaddeus Metz
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.360561
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
This article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes in favour of the latter rationale. Deeming slurs to be wrong insofar as they are unfriendly is shown to capture the advantages of the other theories, while avoiding their disadvantages.
Este artĆ­culo busca proporcionar una descripciĆ³n completa y fundamental de por quĆ© los epĆ­tetos raciales y slurs similares son inmorales, allĆ” donde lo sean. Considera tres teorĆ­as principales, segĆŗn las cuales, a grandes rasgos, son inmorales porque son daƱinos (bienestarismo), porque socavan la autonomĆ­a (kantianismo) o porque son hostiles (un enfoque relacional poco discutido informado por ideas del Sur Global). Este artĆ­culo presenta nuevas objeciones a las dos primeras teorĆ­as y concluye a favor de la Ćŗltima justificaciĆ³n. Se muestra que considerar que los slurs son inmorales en la medida en que son hostiles captura las ventajas de las otras teorĆ­as evitando sus desventajas.
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Dignity , Harm , Immorality , Racial epithets , Relationality , Slurs , Dignidad , DaƱo , Inmoralidad , Insultos Raciales , Relacionalidad
Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de FilosofĆ­a, nĀŗ 84, 2021 pp. 13-29
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10201/142522
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Daimon NĀŗ 84 (2021)
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