Daimon Nº 84 (2021)
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- PublicationOpen AccessProvocative insinuations(Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones, ) Domínguez Armas, Álvaro; Soria Ruiz, AndrésIn this paper we analyse utterances that, without explicitly constituting hate speech, nevertheless convey a hateful message. For exam-ple, in the headline “Iraqi Refugee is convicted in Germany of raping and murdering teenage girl”, the presence of “Iraqi refugee” does not seem arbitrary. To the contrary, it is responsible for inviting a racist inference against Iraqi refu-gees. We defend that these inferences cannot be described as slurs, ethnic or social terms used as insults, dogwhistles or conversational implicatu-res. Rather, we propose that these inferences are insinuations, specifically provocative insinua-tions, as no conversational response seems effec-tive at blocking them
- PublicationOpen AccessI am large, I contain multitudes: Epistemic pragmatism, testimonial injustice and positive intersectionalism(Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones, ) Frápolli, María José; Navarro Laespada, LlanosWe explore the compatibilities and incompatibilities between two highly successful approaches to knowledge: Brandom’s epistemic pragmatism, [EP], and the view that derives from Fricker’s seminal work on the ethics of knowing, [EK]. [EP] and [EK] are complementary approaches that put forward aspects of the application of the concept that deserve to be preserved. Nevertheless, their mere cumulative superposition produces dysfunctions that call for certain readjustments. We propose a positive kind of intersectionalism, [PI], that accounts for the fact that individuals simultaneously belong to diverse groups with variable epistemic conditions, some advantageous, some disadvantageous. [EP], [EK] and [PI] make a rich and coherent picture of subjects as full epistemic agents.
- PublicationOpen AccessPaving the road to hell: The Spanish word menas as a case study(Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones, ) Bordonaba Plou, David; Torices, José R.Menas is a term that has attracted a great deal of attention on the political scene in Spain at present. Although the term had a neutral usage originally, being an acronym for unaccompanied foreign minors, it has recently evolved into a term with clear negative connotations. This article explores what kind of term menas is today. Specifically, we will examine whether menas is a slur or an ESTI, an ethnic/social term used as an insult. First, we point out the most defining characteristics of both types of terms. Then, using analyses on linguistic corpora, we show that menas exhibits the most defining characteristics of ESTIs. We end by discussing the possible evolution of the term, pointing out that, although the term presents the features related to ESTIs, there are two possible scenarios. On the one hand, the term may retain its neutral uses and thus remain an ESTI. On the other hand, the neutral uses may disappear, and thus the term may become a slur.
- PublicationOpen AccessUna concepción pragmatista sobre las reglas(Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones, ) García Jorge, Pedro A.La defensa de la normatividad del significado ha derivado en el debate sobre la prioridad metafísica de las reglas o del significado (cfr. Glüer and Wikforss, 2018). Sin embargo, la defensa de la prioridad de las reglas no es más que una variante de intelectualismo y, por ende, está sujeta a las mismas críticas que éste, mientras que la defensa de la prioridad del significado deja sin respuesta a la pregunta metasemántica ¿cómo es qué el lenguaje es significativo? Una concepción pragmatista sobre las reglas permite superar el debate evitando el intelectualismo y proporcionando una respuesta a la pregunta metasemántica.
- PublicationOpen AccessExactly why are slurs wrong?(Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones, ) Thaddeus MetzThis article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes in favour of the latter rationale. Deeming slurs to be wrong insofar as they are unfriendly is shown to capture the advantages of the other theories, while avoiding their disadvantages.