Publication: Crimen, conexión y castigo: una objeción a la perspectiva
retribucionista de la pena de muerte
Authors
Terán, Dayrón
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.430361
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
Este artículo plantea una objeción a la
perspectiva retribucionista de la pena de muerte.
Si adoptamos un criterio psicológico acerca de lo
que es moralmente relevante en términos de autointerés,
nuestras intuiciones sobre la retribución y
el merecimiento podrían verse seriamente afectadas.
La consideración de que la pena de muerte es
la justa retribución a cierta clase de delitos parece
presuponer en el ejecutado la existencia de una
entidad subyacente a todos los cambios subjetivos
diacrónicos. Si no hay tal entidad, o si esta no es
lo moralmente relevante, el carácter retributivo de
la pena podría verse significativamente reducido.
This paper raises an objection to the retributive view of the death penalty. If we take a psychological approach about what morally matters, our intuitions on retribution and merit could be significantly modified. The claim that death penalty is the fair retribution to certain kind of crimes presuppose in the executed the existence of an underlying entity which would remain identic to itself troughth all the diachronic subjective changes. If this entity does not exist, or if its continuity is not what matters, the retributive nature of the death penalty could be considerably reduced.
This paper raises an objection to the retributive view of the death penalty. If we take a psychological approach about what morally matters, our intuitions on retribution and merit could be significantly modified. The claim that death penalty is the fair retribution to certain kind of crimes presuppose in the executed the existence of an underlying entity which would remain identic to itself troughth all the diachronic subjective changes. If this entity does not exist, or if its continuity is not what matters, the retributive nature of the death penalty could be considerably reduced.
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Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 88 (2023), pp. 23-36
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