Publication: El problema de los universales en W. Quine: ¿nominalismo o conceptualismo?
Authors
Haro Almansa, Francisco
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.592371
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
En este artículo se examinará la postura de Willard van Orman Quine respecto de la cuestión de los universales. Un rasgo evidente de su pensamiento es su manifiesto rechazo de cualquier concepción realista respecto de los uni-versales (tanto platónica como aristotélica). Sin embargo, no es evidente si su postura es “nomina-lista” (como normalmente se la considera) o más bien una forma de conceptualismo constructivista (como él mismo se atribuye). Para resolver esta cuestión, se examinarán sus tesis sobre la forma-ción de oraciones universales y su teoría del sig-nificado como conducta. A través de este análisis, se concluirá si estas posturas son compatibles con alguna forma de conceptualismo, o si por el contrario desembocan en un nominalismo en sentido estricto. Una vez la postura quineana haya sido clarificada, se expondrán algunas dificultades a las que se enfrenta.
This paper will examine Willard van Orman Quine’s position on the question of universals. An obvious feature of his thought is his manifest rejection of any realist conception of universals (both Platonic and Aristotelian). However, it is not clear whether his stance is “nominalist” (as it is usually considered) or rather a form of constructivist conceptualism (as he ascribes to himself). To resolve this question, his thesis on universal sentence formation and his theory of meaning as behavior will be examined. Through this analysis, it will be concluded whether these positions are compatible with some form of con-ceptualism, or whether, on the contrary, they lead to nominalism in the strict sense. Once the Quinean position has been clarified, some of the dif-ficulties it faces will be exposed.
This paper will examine Willard van Orman Quine’s position on the question of universals. An obvious feature of his thought is his manifest rejection of any realist conception of universals (both Platonic and Aristotelian). However, it is not clear whether his stance is “nominalist” (as it is usually considered) or rather a form of constructivist conceptualism (as he ascribes to himself). To resolve this question, his thesis on universal sentence formation and his theory of meaning as behavior will be examined. Through this analysis, it will be concluded whether these positions are compatible with some form of con-ceptualism, or whether, on the contrary, they lead to nominalism in the strict sense. Once the Quinean position has been clarified, some of the dif-ficulties it faces will be exposed.
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Empirismo , Clases , Universales , Realismo , Conceptualismo , Nominalismo , Empiricism , Classes , Universals , Realism , Realism , Conceptualism , Nominalism , Quine
Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 2026, nº. 98, pp. 163-178
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