Publication: La visión pragmatista de C.S. Peirce sobre la aserción
Authors
Alfaro Iglesias, Jaime
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon/237661
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
C.S. Peirce defendió una visión pragmatista de la aserción en términos de su efecto normativo. El presente artículo tiene dos objetivos. El primero es reconstruir y evaluar el argumento de Peirce a favor de la tesis de que aseverar una proposición es hacerse responsable de su verdad. El segundo es argumentar que Peirce interpretó “responsabilidad por la verdad” como la
adquisición de un compromiso dialógico, a saber, el deber de defender la proposición aseverada dando razones ante desafío.
C.S. Peirce defended a pragmatist view of assertion in terms of its normative effect. This paper has two goals. First, to reconstruct and assess Peirce’s argument for the thesis that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth. Second, to argue that Peirce interpreted “responsibility for truth” as the acquisition of a dialogi al commitment, namely, the duty to defend the proposition asserted by giving reasons upon challenge.
C.S. Peirce defended a pragmatist view of assertion in terms of its normative effect. This paper has two goals. First, to reconstruct and assess Peirce’s argument for the thesis that to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth. Second, to argue that Peirce interpreted “responsibility for truth” as the acquisition of a dialogi al commitment, namely, the duty to defend the proposition asserted by giving reasons upon challenge.
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Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 71, 2017, 123-136
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