Publication: Acoger la excepción. La prudencia del juez como punto de conexión entre las ideas schmittianas y aristotélicas
Authors
García-Huidobro, Joaquín ; Pérez Lasserre, Diego
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.373451
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
Este trabajo pretende justificar que, aun cuando es cierto que hay diferencias entre la filosofía aristotélica y la schmittiana, existe un punto de conexión entre ambos en lo que se refiere a la prudencia. En particular, se pretende demostrar que en la descripción que hace Schmitt de la función del juez en Ley y Juicio (1912) y en Sobre los tres modos de pensar la ciencia jurídica (1934) están presentes ideas propias de la filosofía práctica del Estagirita.
This work aims to justify that, although it is true that there are differences between Aristotelian and Schmittian philosophy, there is a point of connection between both in what refers to prudence. In particular, we intend to demonstrate that in Schmitt’s description of the role of the judge in Law and Judgment (1912) and On the three types of juristic thought (1934) ideas of the practical philosophy of the Stagirite are present.
This work aims to justify that, although it is true that there are differences between Aristotelian and Schmittian philosophy, there is a point of connection between both in what refers to prudence. In particular, we intend to demonstrate that in Schmitt’s description of the role of the judge in Law and Judgment (1912) and On the three types of juristic thought (1934) ideas of the practical philosophy of the Stagirite are present.
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Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 83, 2021 pp. 185-199
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