Publication: Los experimentos mentales como género literario en el debate sobre identidad personal
Authors
Muñoz Corcuera, Alfonso
item.page.secondaryauthor
item.page.director
Publisher
Universidad de Murcia
publication.page.editor
publication.page.department
DOI
item.page.type
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
El uso de experimentos mentales tradi-
cionalmente ha sido uno de los principales recur-
sos metodológicos en el debate sobre la identidad
personal. Sin embargo, en las últimas décadas han
recibido un creciente número de críticas. Esto ha
provocado que muchos filósofos interesados en el
problema de la identidad personal los hayan aban-
donado. Es el caso de la mayoría de los teóricos
de la identidad narrativa. En este artículo comparo
las críticas de Wilkes a los experimentos mentales
con las de Ricoeur. Al hacerlo, espero demos-
trar que sus críticas se cancelan mutuamente, al
menos de manera parcial, y que los teóricos de la
identidad narrativa están comprometidos a acep-
tar el uso de experimentos mentales
The use of thought experiments has been one of the main methodological resources in the debate on personal identity. However, over the past decades, there has been an increasing amount of criticism against them. This has caused that many philosophers interested in the problem of personal identity have abandoned this methodo- logy. This is the case with most of narrative identity theorists. In the present paper, I compare Wilkesʼ criticisms against thought experiments with Ricoeurʼs. In doing so, I hope to show that they partially cancel each other, and that narrative identity theorists are committed to accept the use of thought experiments.
The use of thought experiments has been one of the main methodological resources in the debate on personal identity. However, over the past decades, there has been an increasing amount of criticism against them. This has caused that many philosophers interested in the problem of personal identity have abandoned this methodo- logy. This is the case with most of narrative identity theorists. In the present paper, I compare Wilkesʼ criticisms against thought experiments with Ricoeurʼs. In doing so, I hope to show that they partially cancel each other, and that narrative identity theorists are committed to accept the use of thought experiments.
publication.page.subject
Citation
item.page.embargo
Collections
Ir a Estadísticas
Sin licencia Creative Commons.