Publication: Los perjuicios de la arrogancia
Authors
Eraña Lagos, Ángeles
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.570921
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
La arrogancia epistémica es un vicio que produce diversos tipos de daño. Analizaré algunos de los perjuicios epistémicos que aca-rrea, en particular la despersonalización -que involucra la invisibilización y el silenciamiento a personas que pertenecen a ciertos grupos sociales-, el extractivismo cognitivo y la ignorancia. El argumento central es que, si pensamos en la arrogancia como una cualidad individual, enton-ces combatirla no es suficiente para enfrentar la injusticia que prevalece en nuestras sociedades actuales. Sin embargo hay buenas razones para pensarla como una propiedad que se desprende de un sistema de relaciones sociales. Su contraparte, la humildad epistémica, es una virtud relacional y su cultivo puede contribuir para dirigirnos hacia el camino de la justicia epistémica.
Epistemic arrogance is a vice that produces different types of damage. I will focus on the epistemic harms that it causes. In particu-lar, depersonalization -which involves silencing and invisibilizing people that belongs to specific social groups-, cognitive extractivism and igno-rance. My main argument is that if we conceive arrogance as a personal character then fighting it is not enough to face epistemic injustice. However, there are good reasons to think of it as a rela-tional property. Thus, it is plausible to also think that its counterpart, epistemic humility, is also a relational character and that cultivating it can con-tribute to finding epistemic justice.
Epistemic arrogance is a vice that produces different types of damage. I will focus on the epistemic harms that it causes. In particu-lar, depersonalization -which involves silencing and invisibilizing people that belongs to specific social groups-, cognitive extractivism and igno-rance. My main argument is that if we conceive arrogance as a personal character then fighting it is not enough to face epistemic injustice. However, there are good reasons to think of it as a rela-tional property. Thus, it is plausible to also think that its counterpart, epistemic humility, is also a relational character and that cultivating it can con-tribute to finding epistemic justice.
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Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 2026, nº. 98, pp. 95-110
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