Publication: Compromisos sociales y obligaciones racionales
Authors
Del Corral De Felipe, Miranda
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.6018/186921
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
Este artículo defiende que las obligaciones sociales emergen de las normas de la racionalidad. A través de un análisis de los requisitos normativos de la racionalidad que gobiernan los compromisos individuales, se muestra que los agentes poseen autoridad racional para revaluar sus razones, modificar sus juicios prácticos y cambiar sus intenciones. De esta autoridad depende su autonomía racional: uno y el mismo sujeto puede obligarse a hacer algo, y revocar esta orden. Mediante un compromiso social, el deudor renuncia a su autoridad y autonomía racionales en favor del acreedor, generando así una obligación en el deudor, un derecho en el acreedor, y una razón normativa relativa al deudor.
This paper defends the idea that social obligations emerge from the norms governing rationality. Through an analysis of the normative requirements of rationality, it will be argued that agents posses rational authority to reevaluate her reasons, to modify her practical judgements, and to change her intentions. Rational autonomy, the capacity to both acquire and revoke an individual commitment, depends on rational authority. In a social commitment, the debtor gives up her rational autonomy and authority in favor of the creditor, creating hereby an obligation for the debtor, a right for the creditor, and a normative reason relative to the debtor.
This paper defends the idea that social obligations emerge from the norms governing rationality. Through an analysis of the normative requirements of rationality, it will be argued that agents posses rational authority to reevaluate her reasons, to modify her practical judgements, and to change her intentions. Rational autonomy, the capacity to both acquire and revoke an individual commitment, depends on rational authority. In a social commitment, the debtor gives up her rational autonomy and authority in favor of the creditor, creating hereby an obligation for the debtor, a right for the creditor, and a normative reason relative to the debtor.
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Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 2015, nº 66, pp. 27-40
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