Publication: What argumentative bullshit tells us about argumentative vices and virtues
Authors
Gascón, José Ángel
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Publisher
Springer
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10114-y
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
© 2024, The Author(s). This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. This document is the Published version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Topoi. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10114-y
Abstract
The study of the problem of argumentative bullshit can be useful to shed some light on the practice of argumentation and the essence of argumentative virtues. Since argumentative bullshit is arguably the greatest threat to argumentation, and it is characterised by an indifference to the constitutive value of argumentation (supporting a claim with reasons), argumentative virtue could be understood as the opposite to that indifference: caring about the practice of argumentation and being disposed to sustain and improve it through their participation in it. Whoever produces argumentative bullshit cares more about certain external ends (reputation, political goals, making fun…) than about argumentative practice, whereas virtuous arguers never lose sight of the value of the argumentative practice. This suggests a MacIntyrean conception of the practice of argumentation, according to which argumentation is a practice with internal goods than can only be recognised and achieved through participation in it, while argumentative virtues are those traits conducive to the appreciation and achievement of argumentative goods.
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Citation
Topoi (2025) 44:841–851
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