Publication: Spinoza contra la extirpación estoica de las pasiones
Authors
Hoyos, Inmaculada
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia
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DOI
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
El propósito de este trabajo es entablar
un diálogo entre Spinoza y el estoicismo a
propósito de su teoría de las pasiones. En este
sentido, la tesis principal que se sostiene es que
Spinoza mantiene una concepción de la virtud y
de la felicidad similar a la aristotélica, y que, por
esa razón, su terapia de las pasiones no insta a
extirpar las pasiones, como sí hace el estoicismo,
sino que propone seleccionarlas y encauzarlas
racionalmente para aprovechar su fuerza en el
sentido de la virtud.
The aim of this paper is to establish a dialogue between Spinoza and the stoicism about their theory of passions. In this respect, this work maintains that Spinoza has a conception of virtue and hapiness similar to the aristotelian one, and therefore, that his therapie of passions doesn´t lie in eradicate the passions, as the stoicism proposes, but in select and channel them rationally to make use of their force in the meaning of the virtue
The aim of this paper is to establish a dialogue between Spinoza and the stoicism about their theory of passions. In this respect, this work maintains that Spinoza has a conception of virtue and hapiness similar to the aristotelian one, and therefore, that his therapie of passions doesn´t lie in eradicate the passions, as the stoicism proposes, but in select and channel them rationally to make use of their force in the meaning of the virtue
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