Publication: Kant y el sentido pragmático de la psiquiatría
Authors
Solé Plans, Sergi
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.569041
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
La psiquiatría es un oficio práctico, clínico. No obstante, la comprensión de su pra-xis se ha visto a menudo mediada por discipli-nas ajenas a su desempeño asistencial. El papel de la subjetividad ha sido ampliamente debatido. Relevante en este sentido es la interpretación que ofreció Gladys Swain acerca de la incompatibili-dad del sujeto kantiano con la vocación terapéu-tica de la psiquiatría naciente. Nos proponemos aquí revisar la concepción de la enfermedad mental en Kant y su relación con la subjetividad. Defenderemos su aproximación pragmática al sufrimiento mental y sostendremos que resulta aporética su pretensión de fundamentarlo en ins-tancias trascendentales. Precisamente basándonos en su acercamiento antropológico destacaremos la importancia para el juicio clínico del proceder reflexionante que en la obra kantiana vertebra la comprensión de la orgánica pluralidad del mundo
Psychiatry is a practical, clinical pro-fession. However, the understanding of its praxis has often been mediated by disciplines outside of its care performance. The role of subjectivity has been widely debated. Relevant in this sense is Gladys Swain’s interpretation of the incompat-ibility of the Kantian subject with the therapeutic vocation of nascent psychiatry. We propose here to review Kant’s conception of mental illness and its relation to subjectivity. We will defend his pragmatic approach to mental suffering and argue that his claim to ground it in transcendental instances is aporetic. Precisely on the basis of his anthropological approach, we will highlight the importance for clinical judgement of the reflec-tive procedure that in Kant’s work is the back-bone of the understanding of the organic plurality of the world.
Psychiatry is a practical, clinical pro-fession. However, the understanding of its praxis has often been mediated by disciplines outside of its care performance. The role of subjectivity has been widely debated. Relevant in this sense is Gladys Swain’s interpretation of the incompat-ibility of the Kantian subject with the therapeutic vocation of nascent psychiatry. We propose here to review Kant’s conception of mental illness and its relation to subjectivity. We will defend his pragmatic approach to mental suffering and argue that his claim to ground it in transcendental instances is aporetic. Precisely on the basis of his anthropological approach, we will highlight the importance for clinical judgement of the reflec-tive procedure that in Kant’s work is the back-bone of the understanding of the organic plurality of the world.
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Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 2026, nº. 98, pp. 37-51
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