Person:
Raja Galián, Vicente

Profile Picture
Name
Raja Galián, Vicente
publication.page.department
Universidad de Murcia. Departamento de Filosofía
Repository logoRepository logoRepository logo

Filters

2018 - 201922020 - 20241
3
3
Reset filters

Settings

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Open Access
    Two species of realism
    (Springer, 2024-07-26) Raja Galián, Vicente; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
    Different species of realism have been proposed in the scientific and philosophical literature. Two of these species are direct realism and causal pattern realism. Direct realism is a form of perceptual realism proposed by ecological psychologists within cognitive science. Causal pattern realism has been proposed within the philosophy of model-based science. Both species are able to accommodate some of the main tenets and motivations of instrumentalism. The main aim of this paper is to explore the conceptual moves that make both direct realism and causal pattern realism tenable realist positions able to accommodate an instrumentalist stance. Such conceptual moves are (i) the rejection of veritism and (ii) the re-structuring of the phenomena of interest. We will then show that these conceptual moves are instances of the ones of a common realist genus we name pragmatist realism.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Open Access
    The Cognition-Perception Distinction Across Paradigms: An Ecological View
    (Cognitive Science Society, 2018) Raja Galián, Vicente; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
    Folk psychology takes perception and cognition to be two distinct processes. It seems that when we perceive the world we are engaged in one kind of activity and when we think about it we are engaged in a different one. This conception underlies various discussions within the cognitive sciences, such as on the architecture and modularity of the mind, and the cognitive penetrability of perception. But is the distinction justified? This paper looks for an answer in two opposing paradigms in the sciences of the mind: traditional cognitivism and ecological psychology. Even though cognitivism is the dominant paradigm, we argue that it has thus far failed to give a definite account of the relation between perception and cognition, and to support or to deny their separation. Ecological psychology, on the other hand, rejects the distinction and integrates cognition with perception. We discuss previous work within the ecological view and sketch directions for future research.
  • Thumbnail Image
    Publication
    Open Access
    Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”
    (Springer, 2019-11-21) Raja Galián, Vicente; Chemero, Anthony; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
    A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to explain “real cognition” without invoking mental representations. This paper provides an account of explicit, real-time thinking of the kind we engage in when we imagine counter-factual situations, remember the past, and plan for the future. We first present a very general non-representational account of explicit thinking, based on pragmatist philosophy of science. We then present a more detailed instantiation of this general account drawing on nonlinear dynamics and ecological psychology.
Ir a Estadísticas