Ríos Martínez, Ana María

Person:
Ríos Martínez, Ana María

Name

Ríos Martínez, Ana María

publication.page.department

Universidad de Murcia. Departamento de Ciencia Política, AntropologíaSocial y Hacienda Pública

Full item page

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 11

Restricted
Empirical evidence for efficiency in provision of drinking water
(ASCE, 2019) Benito, Bernardino; Faura, Ursula; Guillamón, María-Dolores; Ríos Martínez, Ana María; Ciencia Política, Antropología Social y Hacienda Pública
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it assesses the efficiency of the drinking water supply in the Spanish municipalities of over 5,000 inhabitants. Second, it examines the hypothesis that this efficiency is conditioned by a group of environmental variables. Unlike monitoring reports based on descriptive methods, this paper uses the double data envelopment analysis bootstrap procedure to ascertain efficiency determinants. The results show that municipalities could improve their efficiency by modifying the scale at which they are operating. Regarding the determinants of efficiency, population density has been found to have a positive effect on the level of efficiency in the public service covered by this study. Moreover, it is shown that most tourist municipalities are more efficient at managing water supply service. These findings also suggest that there is greater efficiency when the provision of drinking water is managed directly by the local government. Finally, no significant impact of citizens’ level of income, political ideology, and strength on drinking water supply efficiency is found.
Embargo
Determinants of public engagement on municipalities’ Facebook pages
(TAYLOR & FRANCIS INC, 2020) Metallo, Concetta; Gesuele, Benedetta; Guillamón, María Dolores; Ríos Martínez, Ana María; Ciencia Política, Antropología Social y Hacienda Pública
This article analyzes the determinants of public engagement on the Facebook pages of municipalities. The sample consists of 170 Italian and Spanish municipalities that used Facebook in 2014. The findings show that posting a lot of information on municipal Facebook pages does not increase the engagement of citizens. Also, frequent posting of information per se does not engage public engagement. However, if the posts are published when public can pay attention to them (e.g., off days), the likelihood of public engagement increases. Furthermore, the citizens’ engagement on municipal Facebook page depends on the level of citizens’ income – there is a negative relationship between citizens’ income and the level of participation.
Embargo
The sustainable development goals: how does their implementation affect the financial sustainability of the largest Spanish municipalities?
(Wiley, 2023) Benito, Bernardino; Guillamón, María-Dolores; Ríos Martínez, Ana María; Ciencia Política, Antropología Social y Hacienda Pública
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) present a universal challenge to which all society must be committed. Local governments play a fundamental role as they are closest to citizens, with first-hand knowledge of their needs and as providers of essential services. Municipal governments are involved in many aspects of SDG implementation. Thus, these governments should work towards their implementation, bearing in mind that involvement in these issues may affect municipal finances. This paper analyses the impact of SDG implementation by local governments on financial sustainability. Our results show that municipalities with better SDG compliance have shorter supplier payment periods and smaller surpluses (or higher deficits). However, better implementation does not affect gross savings or municipal debt per capita.
Open Access
Does gender matter in budget deviations: an empirical assessment of Spanish local governments
(Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge, 2021-04-08) Cuadrado-Ballesteros, Beatriz; Guillamón, María-Dolores; Ríos Martínez, Ana María; Ciencia Política, Antropología Social y Hacienda Pública
By using a sample of 140 Spanish municipalities for the period 2008-2018, our results show that the gender of the mayor and the percentage of women councillors in local governments influence budget deviations both in expenditures and revenues. Concretely, municipalities with women mayors and more female members tend to overestimate revenues and underestimate expenditures; but these effects turn contrary when the number of female councillors increases, resulting in a better financial situation. Then, we may conclude that women could contribute to the financial health of local governments once they have enough representation.
Restricted
The efficiency of public services in small municipalities: the case of drinking water
(Elsevier, 2019) Benito, Bernardino; Faura, Ursula; Guillamón, María Dolores; Ríos Martínez, Ana María; Ciencia Política, Antropología Social y Hacienda Pública
This paper uses DEA methodology to analyze the efficiency of the drinking water provision service in small municipalities. Once the efficiency indicators are obtained, these are related to a group of exogenous variables, so as to evaluate the determinants of efficiency. We use a sample of Spanish municipalities of under 5000 inhabitants in 2014, and the results show a negative and significant impact of population density and citizens' level of income on the drinking water supply efficiency. Moreover, the greater the political strength of the local government, the higher the level of efficiency in the provision of drinking water. The findings also show that there is greater efficiency when the provision of drinking water is managed directly by the local government. Finally, there is no significant impact of the touristic character of the municipality or of the government's political ideology on the efficiency of the drinking water supply.
Open Access
Transparencia presupuestaria y control legislativo en las administraciones públicas
(2016-02-02) Ríos Martínez, Ana María; Benito López, Bernardino; Bastida Albaladejo, Francisco José; Facultad de Economía y Empresa
El sector público se financia con recursos económicos procedentes de los ciudadanos, por lo que es comprensible que éstos demanden cada día una mayor transparencia con el fin de controlar las actividades que realizan las administraciones públicas. En este sentido, el presupuesto es el instrumento mediante el cual los gobiernos plantean la forma en la que se proponen cumplir con sus responsabilidades durante cada ejercicio. Según International Budget Partnership (IBP) (2012), la mejor manera de optimizar la asignación de los recursos públicos es a través de procesos presupuestarios transparentes, que cuenten con sólidas instituciones de control (p. ej., control legislativo) y abiertos a la participación ciudadana. Estas prácticas presupuestarias pueden afectar positivamente al crecimiento económico, la eficiencia y la equidad, lo que podría llevar a reducir la pobreza y crear un desarrollo económico sostenible. Sin embargo, los presupuestos de las economías modernas son muy complejos, lo que permite implementar prácticas que intentan ocultar el equilibrio presupuestario real. Así, los políticos tienen pocos incentivos para realizar los presupuestos de forma transparente (Alesina y Perotti, 1996). Además, desafortunadamente, el poder legislativo y los ciudadanos han estado tradicionalmente excluidos del proceso presupuestario. En la mayoría de países en vías de desarrollo, los presupuestos públicos son todavía considerados como un secreto de estado, y el proceso presupuestario está controlado exclusivamente por el poder ejecutivo (de Renzio y Krafchik, 2007). A la vista de lo anterior, el Capítulo I de esta tesis tiene por objetivo identificar qué factores socio-económicos, políticos e institucionales determinan el nivel de divulgación de información presupuestaria de los gobiernos centrales, tanto a través de Internet como de otros medios. Para ello, construimos distintos indicadores de la divulgación de información a partir del Open Budget Questionnaire (IBP, 2010). Aplicando mínimos cuadrados ordinarios sobre una muestra de 93 países encuestados por IBP en 2010, nuestros resultados muestran que el uso de internet por parte de los ciudadanos, el nivel educativo de la población, la complejidad de las administraciones públicas, el superávit presupuestario, la cultura administrativa, la competencia política y la ideología de los gobernantes determinan el grado de divulgación de información presupuestaria de los gobiernos centrales. Adicionalmente, un análisis clúster encuentra tres grupos de países: alto, medio y bajo nivel de divulgación de información presupuestaria. Sin embargo, la transparencia presupuestaria es mucho más que la simple divulgación de información presupuestaria. Por esta razón, el Capítulo II pretende completar nuestros resultados anteriores, analizando los determinantes institucionales, políticos y socio-económicos de la transparencia presupuestaria a nivel internacional. Se presta especial atención a uno de los factores institucionales: el control legislativo. Específicamente, este capítulo trata de examinar el efecto que el control que el parlamento ejerce sobre el gobierno, en cuanto a materia presupuestaria se refiere, tiene sobre la transparencia presupuestaria. Usamos el método de los mínimos cuadrados en dos etapas para solventar el posible problema de endogeneidad entre estas variables. Para la misma muestra que el capítulo anterior, mostramos que el control legislativo tiene una influencia positiva sobre la transparencia presupuestaria. Además, encontramos que el sistema legal, la competencia política y el nivel económico de un país también afectan a la transparencia presupuestaria. Adicionalmente, examinamos los determinantes del control legislativo en todas las fases del proceso presupuestario. En este sentido, nuestros resultados revelan que el tipo de poder legislativo, el sistema legal, el control presupuestario por parte de los órganos supremos de auditoría (tribunales de cuentas), el nivel económico y el nivel democrático determinan el grado de control legislativo. Aunque nuestros resultados anteriores muestran que el control legislativo es necesario para que se incremente la transparencia presupuestaria de los gobiernos, existe evidencia de que un fuerte control legislativo del presupuesto puede perjudicar la disciplina fiscal (Wehner, 2007). Por esta razón, consideramos que sería interesante analizar conjuntamente los beneficios y los riesgos asociados al control legislativo del presupuesto en los gobiernos centrales. En concreto, el Capítulo III de esta tesis tiene como objetivo investigar si el control presupuestario del parlamento es un beneficio para la transparencia presupuestaria así como un riesgo para la disciplina fiscal. Aplicando el método de los mínimos cuadrados en tres etapas sobre nuestra muestra de 93 países, encontramos que un mayor control legislativo sobre las decisiones presupuestarias mina la disciplina fiscal, pero simultáneamente también incrementa la transparencia presupuestaria. Tal y como hemos visto, un adecuado control legislativo del presupuesto puede ser fundamental para una buena gestión pública. El poder legislativo debe controlar las acciones que realiza el ejecutivo y, en nombre de los ciudadanos, asegurarse de que este último rinda cuentas sobre las mismas. Sin embargo, también es esencial que los ciudadanos tengan la oportunidad de participar directamente, sin intermediarios, en el proceso presupuestario. En consonancia, el último capítulo de esta tesis, el Capítulo IV, tiene como objetivo examinar qué factores socio-económicos, institucionales y políticos fomentan la participación ciudadana en el proceso presupuestario de los gobiernos centrales. Empleando el método de los mínimos cuadrados en tres etapas y utilizando una muestra de 100 países para 2012, nuestros resultados muestran que el uso de Internet por parte de los ciudadanos, el tamaño de la población, la situación financiera del gobierno y la transparencia presupuestaria determinan las oportunidades de los ciudadanos para participar en el proceso presupuestario. Adicionalmente, encontramos no solo que la transparencia presupuestaria promueve la participación ciudadana sino también que la participación ciudadana da lugar a una mayor transparencia presupuestaria. The public sector is mainly funded by taxpayers, who require transparent information to be able to monitor public administration activities. Budget is the tool governments use to implement specific policy objectives during each fiscal year. According to International Budget Partnership (IBP) (2012), the best way to improve the allocation of public resources is by using budget systems that are transparent, have robust oversight institutions (e.g., legislatures) and are open to public engagement. Such budgeting practices can positively impact growth, efficiency and equity, thus reducing poverty and creating sustained economic development. However, modern economies’ budgets are very complex, allowing practices that aim to veil the real budget balance. Thus, politicians have little incentives to disclose transparent budgets (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). Moreover, unfortunately, legislatures and citizens have been traditionally excluded from budget decision-making and monitoring. In most developing countries, public budgeting is still considered as a state secret, and the process is controlled exclusively by the executive (de Renzio and Krafchik, 2007). Given the above, Chapter I of this thesis attempts to identify what socio-economic, political and institutional factors determine the level of central government budget information disclosure, both through the Internet and other media. It builds budget disclosure indicators based on the Open Budget questionnaire (IBP, 2010). Applying ordinary least squares to a sample of 93 countries surveyed by IBP in 2010, our results show that Internet penetration, education level, relative central government size, budget surplus, administrative culture, political competition and incumbents’ ideology determine central governments’ budget disclosure. Additionally, a cluster analysis finds three groups of countries: high, medium and low level of budget disclosure. However, budget transparency is much more than the simple disclosure of budget information. For this reason, Chapter II aims to complement our prior findings by analysing the institutional, political and socio-economic determinants of budget transparency in an international comparative approach. We will mainly focus on one institutional factor: legislative budgetary oversight. Specifically, this chapter attempts to evaluate the role the legislative budgetary oversight plays in enhancing budget transparency. We run a two-stage least squares regression as a way to solve the endogeneity problem between these variable. For the same sample as in the previous chapter, we show that legislative budgetary oversight has a positive influence on budget transparency. Besides, the legal system, political competition, and economic level are also found to affect budget transparency. As an additional analysis, we investigate the determinants of legislative budgetary oversight along the budgetary process. In this vein, the type of legislature, legal system, Supreme Audit Institution’s budgetary oversight, economic level, and democratic level determine legislative budgetary oversight. Although our previous findings show that legislative budgetary oversight is essential for budget transparency, there is also evidence that powerful legislatures can undermine fiscal discipline (Wehner, 2007). Therefore, we consider it necessary to analyse the potential risks and benefits associated with legislative budgetary oversight simultaneously. In particular, Chapter III of this thesis aims to ascertain whether legislative budgetary oversight is a benefit to budget transparency as well as a risk to fiscal discipline. Applying three-stage least squares to our sample of 93 countries, we find that legislative budgetary oversight is not only a risk in terms of decreasing fiscal discipline but also a benefit, as stronger legislative oversight leads to greater budget transparency. Given the above, an adequate legislative budgetary oversight might play an important role in governance. Legislatures may oversight the activities of the executive and, on behalf of citizens, holding the the government accountable. However, it is also essential that citizens have opportunities to participate directly, without intermediaries, in the budget process. Accordingly, the last chapter of this thesis, Chapter IV, attempts to investigate which socio-economic, institutional and political factors promote public engagement in the central government budget process. Using the three-stage least squares estimation method for a sample of 100 countries surveyed by IBP in 2012, our results indicate that Internet use rate, population, governmental financial situation and budget transparency determine opportunities for public engagement in the central government budget process. In addition, we show that not only budget transparency promotes public participation but also public participation is essential to enhance budget transparency.
Open Access
Can salaries and re-election prevent political corruption? An empirical evidence
(2018) Benito López, Bernardino; Guillamón López, María Dolores; Bastida, Francisco; Ríos Martínez, Ana María
Background and objectives: This paper mainly focuses on decisions taken by politicians that may affect the level of municipal corruption. Specifically, we study whether local politicians’ incentives to be corrupt are influenced by the wages they receive and/or their intention to run for next elections. This issue has hardly been empirically tackled before at local level. Method and data: Our sample comprises 358 Spanish municipalities of over 20,000 inhabitants for the period 2004–2009. We use two different methods of estimation, ordinary least squares and ordered logit model, to analyze the influence of politician’s wages and/or their intention to seek re-election on corruption. We utilize as gauge of corruption the total cases of urban corruption (reported in the online press) in each municipality during this period. Results: We show an impact of wages and re-election on corruption. First, relatively higher wages do not reduce politicians’ incentives to be corrupt. Second, when politicians want to be re-elected, corruption decreases. We also find that income level, income inequality, education level, municipal urban revenues and touristic nature of the municipality affect corruption. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that it is necessary that local governments pay particular attention to rules related to the way politicians’ wages are set and the term limits restrictions
Open Access
Measuring environmental performance in the treatment of municipal solid waste: the case of the European Union-28
(Elsevier, 2021) Picazo-Tadeo, Andrés J.; Ríos Martínez, Ana María; Ciencia Política, Antropología Social y Hacienda Pública
This paper proposes a measure of environmental performance in the treatment of municipal solid waste, which is defined as a ratio between a composite indicator of waste treated through environmentally desirable operations –recycling and recovery in our case study– and a composite indicator of waste treated through undesirable operations –landfill and incineration. Moreover, it contributes both overall and treatment-specific indicators of performance. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques are used to compute the environmental performance indicators and they are illustrated with an empirical assessment of the environmental performance of the European Union-28 (EU-28) members in their treatment of municipal waste, with data for the year 2017. Our results point to a worryingly low average level of performance, with the best performers being mainly Nordic and Central European countries such as Sweden, Germany, Belgium, Finland and Denmark; at the opposite end of the spectrum, environmental performance in the treatment of waste is particularly low in most of the Eastern European countries that joined the EU-28 from the 2000s, and some Southern member states. The determinants of performance are also investigated, the main finding being a positive and statistically significant association between environmental performance in municipal waste treatment and the level of economic development.
Restricted
Influence of selected aspects of local governance on the efficiency of waste collection and street cleaning services
(PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD, 2021) Benito, Bernardino; Guillamón, María-Dolores; Martínez, Pedro J.; Ríos Martínez, Ana María; Ciencia Política, Antropología Social y Hacienda Pública
Currently, in all developed countries there is great interest in improving democratic practices in local governments, as the administration closest to citizens. However, the possible influence of these actions on the management of public services and municipal finances have been side-lined, despite the great interest in evaluating the performance of local governments under budgetary constraints. Our research aims to fill this knowledge gap by studying the impact of key aspects of local governance (transparency and citizen participation), together with other environmental variables, on the efficiency of two municipal public services of both qualitative and quantitative importance: waste collection and street cleaning. The results show that the type of management, population density, the tourist activity of the municipality and the strength of local government are determinants that explain the efficiency of the public services examined in this research, while transparency and citizen participation have little impact.
Open Access
Voting behavior and budget stability
(2013) Vicente, Cristina; Guillamón López, María Dolores; Ríos Martínez, Ana María
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the implementation of the Budgetary Stability Law has affected Political Budget Cycles generated by Spanish local governments. Specifically, we study whether the evolution of debt, budget deficit, capital spending and current spending over the electoral cycle has changed after the introduction of this law. We use a sample of 132 Spanish municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants (including the provincial capitals) during the period 1995-2009. Our results show that the Budgetary Stability Law has avoided electoral cycles in debt. On the contrary, the adoption of this law has not mitigated the incumbents’ incentives to manipulate deficit, capital spending and current spending with electoral aims. Nevertheless, it has caused a change in the way in which mayors manipulate fiscal policy over the electoral cycle. The opportunistic expansion covered both preelectoral year and the electoral year before the implementation of this fiscal rule, while after that, deficit and spending increases are confined in the election year.