Browsing by Subject "Philosophy of science"
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- PublicationOpen AccessDe la filosofía de la ciencia a la filosofía de la tecnociencia(Universidad de Murcia, 2010) Echeverría, JavierEste artículo describe los cambios experimentados por la filosofía de la ciencia durante la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Parte del positivismo lógico y comenta el giro naturalista, el giro historicista, el giro cognitivo y la concepción CTS de la ciencia y la tecnología. Se afirma que una filosofía del conocimiento científico no es suficiente para analizar y reconstruir la tecnociencia contemporánea, que difiere en muchos aspectos de la ciencia moderna. Como conclusión, se propone una filosofía de la práctica científica y tecnocientífica, que vincule estrechamente la filosofía de la ciencia y de la tecnología.
- PublicationRestrictedExperimentation, “models” and the turn to practice(Springer, 2020-09-08) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; FilosofíaReview of Isabelle F. Peschard and Bas C. Van Fraassen (Eds.): The experimental side of modeling. University of Minnesota Press, 2018, 336pp, $40 PB
- PublicationOpen AccessGibson’s reasons for realism and gibsonian reasons for anti-realism: an ecological approach to model-based reasoning in science(Cognitive Science Society, 2016) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía; Papafragou, A., Grodner, D., Mirman, D., & Trueswell, J.C.Representational views of the mind traditionally face a skeptical challenge on perceptual knowledge: if our experience of the world is mediated by representations built upon perceptual inputs, how can we be certain that our representations are accurate and our perceptual apparatus reliable? J. J. Gibson’s ecological approach provides an alternative framework, according to which direct perception of affordances does away with the need to posit internal mental representations as intermediary steps between perceptual input and behavioral output. Gibson accordingly spoke of his framework as providing “reasons for realism.” In this paper I suggest that, granting Gibson his reasons for perceptual realism, the Gibsonian framework motivates antirealism when it comes to scientific theorizing and modeling. If scientists are Gibsonian perceivers, then it makes sense to take their use of models in indirect investigations of real-world phenomena not as representations of the phenomena, but rather as autonomous tools with their own affordances.
- PublicationOpen AccessModel-based science: diverse perspectives, little cross-disciplinary dialogue(Springer, 2018) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Sin departamento asociadoReview of Lorenzo Magnani and Tommaso Bertolotti (Editors): Springer handbook of model-based science. Dordrecht: Springer, 2017, 1179pp.
- PublicationOpen AccessReview of "Inference and Representation: A Study in Modeling Science"(Cambridge University Press; Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2025) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; FilosofíaReview of Mauricio Suárez (2024) Inference and Representation: A Study in Modeling Science. University of Chicago Press
- PublicationRestrictedReview of A. C. Grayling’s “The Age of Genius: The Seventeenth Century and the Birth of the Modern Mind”(Metapsychology Online Reviews, 2016) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
- PublicationOpen AccessTheory, Practice, and Non-Reductive (Meta)Science(Taylor & Francis, 2018) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; FilosofíaAre the theoretical frameworks of phenomenology and of science compatible? And, if so, what would a reconciliation entail for science as it is practiced? Shaun Gallagher poses these two questions, answering the first in the affirmative and leaving the second unaddressed. I argue that treating the two as separate questions presupposes an inadequate distinction between theory and practice that Gallagher’s non-reductive framework motivates rejecting. Recognizing the intertwining of theory and practice allows us to answer Gallagher’s two questions about phenomenology and science all at once, but it also motivates a less conciliatory conclusion than the one he offers.
- PublicationOpen AccessTwo species of realism(Springer, 2024-07-26) Raja Galián, Vicente; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; FilosofíaDifferent species of realism have been proposed in the scientific and philosophical literature. Two of these species are direct realism and causal pattern realism. Direct realism is a form of perceptual realism proposed by ecological psychologists within cognitive science. Causal pattern realism has been proposed within the philosophy of model-based science. Both species are able to accommodate some of the main tenets and motivations of instrumentalism. The main aim of this paper is to explore the conceptual moves that make both direct realism and causal pattern realism tenable realist positions able to accommodate an instrumentalist stance. Such conceptual moves are (i) the rejection of veritism and (ii) the re-structuring of the phenomena of interest. We will then show that these conceptual moves are instances of the ones of a common realist genus we name pragmatist realism.