Publication: Constitutive Rules of Precedent
Authors
Nuñez Vaquero, A.
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Description
© 2022. This document is made available under the CC-BY-SA 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
This document is the published version of a published work that appeared in final form in Revus, Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.8560
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to reject the thesis that a system of precedent is established with a prescriptive norm. This claim is supported by two lines of reasoning. First, it is claimed that systems of precedent necessarily require constitutive norms and not prescriptive norms. Second, any system of precedent comprises at least two, if not three, constitutive rules of precedent. While one confers the power to set a precedent, another conditions the validity of a judicial decision to the fact that it follows the precedent. Finally, there may also be a third rule that confers the power to ensure that precedent is followed and to annul divergent decisions.
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Citation
Revus, Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law NÂş 46. 2022
https://journals.openedition.org/revus/
https://journals.openedition.org/revus/
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