Publication:
Price versus quantity in a duopoly of vertical differentiation with loss-averse consumers

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Date
2021-03
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Authors
Martínez Sánchez, Francisco
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Publisher
Elsevier
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Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2020.10.008
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
© 2021. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the submitted version of a published work that appeared in final form in Research in Economics
Abstract
In a model àla Mussa and Rosen (1978) in which consumers are loss-averse, I check the robustness of the result obtained by Tanaka (2001) . As he did, I find that the quantity con- tract is a dominant strategy for both firms. Thus, Cournot is the outcome in equilibrium. Finally, I find that loss aversion in general intensifies competition.
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Loss aversion , Price and quantity contracts , Vertical product differentiation
Citation
Research in Economics Volume 75, Issue 1, March 2021, Pages 1-6
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10201/137231
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