Publication:
Do Social Networks Prevent Bank Runs?

dc.contributor.authorGarcia Rosa, Alfonso
dc.contributor.authorKiss, Hubert Janos
dc.contributor.authorRodríguez Lara, Ismael
dc.contributor.departmentFundamentos del Análisis Económico
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-18T14:58:19Z
dc.date.available2010-01-18T14:58:19Z
dc.date.created2010-01
dc.date.issued2010-01-18T14:58:19Z
dc.description.abstractWe develop, both theoretically and experimentally, a stereotypical environment that allows for co-ordination breakdown, leading to a bank run. Three depositors are located at the nodes of a network and have to decide whether to keep their funds deposited or to withdraw. One of the depositors has immediate liquidity needs, whereas the other two depositors do not. Depositors act sequentially and observe others’ actions only if connected by the network. Theoretically, a link connecting the first two depositors to decide is sufficient to avoid a bank run. However, our experimental evidence shows that subjects’choice is not a¤ected by the existence of the link per se. Instead, being observed and the particular action that is observed determine subjects’choice. Our results highlight the importance of initial decisions in the emergence of a bank run. In particular, Bayesian analysis reveals that subjects clearly depart from predicted behavior when observing a withdrawal.en_EN
dc.formatapplication/pdfes
dc.format.extent20en_EN
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10201/9723
dc.languageengen_EN
dc.relation.ispartofProyecto de investigación:en_EN
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP-UMUFAEen_EN
dc.relation.ispartofseries2010.01en_EN
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.subjectBank runsen_EN
dc.subjectCoordination failureen_EN
dc.subjectExperimental evidenceen_EN
dc.subjectNetworksen_EN
dc.subject.otherCDU::3 - Ciencias sociales::33 - Economíaen_EN
dc.titleDo Social Networks Prevent Bank Runs?en_EN
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleen_EN
dspace.entity.typePublicationes
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