Publication: Optimal incentives on multiple prosocial activities when reputation matters
Authors
Candel Sánchez, Francisco ; Perote-Peña, Juan
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Publisher
Wiley
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12369
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
In this paper we present a signaling model in which individuals engage in socially
bene cial but costly activities to convey information about their willingness to cooperate
with other agents. When several activities are available, the inclusion of monetary
compensations in anyone of them affects the relative costs of undertaking each activity
and, therefore, their informative value for agents. We fi nd the subsidies that maximize
social welfare, which are shown to depend critically on the reputation gained from each
activity. Finally, we use comparative statics analysis to study the effects on optimal
subsidies of changes in their determinants.
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Citation
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 122(3), 2020, 1207-1230.
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Este ítem está sujeto a una licencia Creative Commons. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/