Debt Spillovers in a Monetary Union: A Novel Rationale for Central Bank Independence

Campoy Miñarro, J. C.; Negrete Mediavilla, J. C.

Publication:
Debt Spillovers in a Monetary Union: A Novel Rationale for Central Bank Independence

dc.contributor.author	Campoy Miñarro, J. C.
dc.contributor.author	Negrete Mediavilla, J. C.
dc.contributor.department	Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-02T22:10:18Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-02T22:10:18Z
dc.date.issued	2022-01
dc.description	©<2022>. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ This document is the Published Manuscript version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Economics, vol. 16, no. 1. To access the final edited and published work see: doi.org/10.1515/econ-2022-0017
dc.description.abstract	Central bank independence has been championed on the grounds that it avoids political business cycles, the time-inconsistency problem of discretionary monetary policy, and political conflicts. However, after the financial crisis, central banks have resorted to unconventional monetary policies and embraced additional tasks, making monetary authorities more exposed to political interference. This new reality has put into question the long-lasting consensus on the desirability of central bank independence. We add to this debate a new argument in support of that independence, namely, it internalizes the fiscal spillovers that arise in a monetary union, which is not a full fiscal union.
dc.format	application/pdf	es
dc.format.extent	14
dc.identifier.citation	Economics-The Open Access Open-Assessment E-Journal, 16 (1)
dc.identifier.doi	doi.org/10.1515/econ-2022-0017
dc.identifier.issn	1864-6042
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10201/118643
dc.language	eng	es
dc.relation.isreferencedby	ED_IDENTRADA=1004
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	Atribución 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Central Bank Design	es
dc.subject	Fiscal Policies	es
dc.subject	Monetary Union	es
dc.subject	international fiscal spillover	es
dc.title	Debt Spillovers in a Monetary Union: A Novel Rationale for Central Bank Independence	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	es
dspace.entity.type	Publication	es