Publication: On Occasion: Invisible minimalism and the pragmatic frame
Authors
Falcato, Ana
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon/218491
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
Este trabajo compara la peculiar
versión de minimalismo semántico defendida
por Kent Bach con la forma más radical de
contextualismo en la filosofía del lenguaje: el
ocasionalismo de Charles Travis. Bach plantea
una distinción entre una noción semántica
contextualmente invariable de lo que se dice en
un enunciado y los contenidos pragmáticamente
enriquecidos que un hablante puede comunicar
con él, mientras que Travis se niega a aislar el
contenido de lo que se dice en una emisión del acto
de pronunciarlo. Argumentaré que el dualismo de
contenidos defendido por Bach no es sostenible,
porque la estructura teórica que propone termina
intentando atribuir “contenido semántico puro” a
una entidad que es estructuralmente pragmática.
This paper compares Kent Bach’s peculiar version of semantic minimalism with the most radical form of contextualism in philosophy of language: Charles Travis’s occasion-sensitivity. Bach posits a distinction between a contextually insensitive semantic notion of what is said in an utterance and the pragmatically enriched content a speaker can communicate with it, whereas Travis refuses to isolate the content of what is said in an utterance from the act of uttering it. I will argue that Bach’s content dualism fails precisely as a result of its willingness to ascribe “pure semantic content” to an entity that is structurally pragmatic.
This paper compares Kent Bach’s peculiar version of semantic minimalism with the most radical form of contextualism in philosophy of language: Charles Travis’s occasion-sensitivity. Bach posits a distinction between a contextually insensitive semantic notion of what is said in an utterance and the pragmatically enriched content a speaker can communicate with it, whereas Travis refuses to isolate the content of what is said in an utterance from the act of uttering it. I will argue that Bach’s content dualism fails precisely as a result of its willingness to ascribe “pure semantic content” to an entity that is structurally pragmatic.
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Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 69, 2016, pp. 73-92
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