Computation of multi-facility location Nash equilibria on a network under quantity competition.

Pelegrín Pelegrín, Blas; Fernández Hernández, Pascual; García Pérez, María Dolores

Publication:
Computation of multi-facility location Nash equilibria on a network under quantity competition.

dc.contributor.author	Pelegrín Pelegrín, Blas
dc.contributor.author	Fernández Hernández, Pascual
dc.contributor.author	García Pérez, María Dolores
dc.contributor.department	Estadística e Investigación Operativa
dc.date.accessioned	2024-01-28T08:04:57Z
dc.date.available	2024-01-28T08:04:57Z
dc.date.issued	2018
dc.description	©2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the Accepted, version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Networks and Spatial Economics. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-019-09463-8	es
dc.description.abstract	We deal with the location-quantity problem for competing firms when they locate multiple facilities and offer the same type of product. Competition is performed under delivered quantities that are sent from the facilities to the customers. This problem is reduced to a location game when the competing firms deliver the Cournot equilibrium quantities. While existence conditions for a Nash equilibrium of the location game have been discussed in many contributions in the literature, computing an equilibrium on a network when multiple facilities are to be located by each firm is a problem not previously addressed. We propose an integer linear programming formulation to fill this gap. The formulation solves the profit maximization problem for a firm, assuming that the other firms have fixed their facility locations. This allows us to compute location Nash equilibria by the best response procedure. A study with data of Spanish municipalities under different scenarios is presented and conclusions are drawn from a sensitivity analysis.	es
dc.format	application/pdf	es
dc.format.extent	18	es
dc.identifier.citation	Networks and Spatial Economics 18 (2018), 999-1017
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-019-09463-8
dc.identifier.issn	1566-113X
dc.identifier.issn	1572-9427
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10201/137860
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	SPRINGER	es
dc.relation	This research has been supported by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness of Spain under the research project MTM2015-70260-P, and the Fundaci´on S´eneca (The Agency of Science and Technology of the Region of Murcia) under the research project 19241/PI/14.	es
dc.relation.publisherversion	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11067-019-09463-8	es
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Multi-facility location	es
dc.subject	Nash equilibria	es
dc.subject	Network optimization	es
dc.subject	Spatial Cournot competition	es
dc.subject.other	CDU::5 - Ciencias puras y naturales::51 - Matemáticas	es
dc.title	Computation of multi-facility location Nash equilibria on a network under quantity competition.	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	es
dspace.entity.type	Publication	es