Publication:
On the Existence and Computation of Nash Equilibrium in Network Competitive Location Under Delivered Pricing and Price Sensitive Demand

dc.contributor.authorPelegrín Pelegrín, Blas
dc.contributor.authorFernández Hernández, Pascual
dc.contributor.authorGarcía Pérez, María Dolores
dc.contributor.departmentEstadística e Investigación Operativa
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-28T08:15:03Z
dc.date.available2024-01-28T08:15:03Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.description©2023. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This document is the Accepted, version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Networks and Spatial Economics. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-023-09598-9es
dc.description.abstractWe address the location-price decision problem for firms that offer the same type of product and compete on delivered pricing. If firms set equilibrium prices at demand points, the problem can be seen as a location game for which the Nash equilibrium (NE) is used as solution concept. For spatially separated markets, with inelastic demand, there exists a NE and it can be found by social cost minimization, as happens in network and planar location. However, with price sensitive demand, the existence of a NE has not been proven yet and socially optimal locations may not be a NE. In this paper we show that a NE can be found in discrete and network location when demand is price sensitive. A Mixed Integer Linear Programming formulation is implemented in the best response procedure which allow to find a NE for a variety of demand functions. An empirical study with data of Spanish municipalities is performed in which the procedure is applied to 200 large size test problems with linear, quadratic, exponential and hyperbolic demand functions.es
dc.formatapplication/pdfes
dc.format.extent18es
dc.identifier.citationNetworks and Spatial Economics 23 (2023), 825-843
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-023-09598-9
dc.identifier.issn1566-113X
dc.identifier.issn1572-9427
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10201/137840
dc.languageenges
dc.publisherSPRINGERes
dc.relationThis research has been supported by the Fundación Séneca (The Agency of Science and Technology of the Region of Murcia) under the research project 19241/PI/14.es
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11067-023-09598-9es
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/*
dc.subjectFacility locationes
dc.subjectDiscrete optimizationes
dc.subjectNash equilibriumes
dc.subjectSpatial competitiones
dc.subject.otherCDU::5 - Ciencias puras y naturales::51 - Matemáticases
dc.titleOn the Existence and Computation of Nash Equilibrium in Network Competitive Location Under Delivered Pricing and Price Sensitive Demandes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees
dspace.entity.typePublicationes
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