Beyond reasonableness: argumentative virtues in pragma-dialectics

Gascón, José Ángel

Publication:
Beyond reasonableness: argumentative virtues in pragma-dialectics

dc.contributor.author	Gascón, José Ángel
dc.contributor.department	Filosofía	es
dc.date.accessioned	2025-09-03T07:24:48Z
dc.date.available	2025-09-03T07:24:48Z
dc.date.issued	2024-07-15
dc.description	© 2024,The Author(s). This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. This document is the Published version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Topoi. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10071-6
dc.description.abstract	The pragma-dialectical research program begins with a philosophical estate, in which a conception of reasonableness is offered that must serve as ground for the theoretical estate. Pragma-dialectics has produced many important insights in the theoretical estate, including the ideal model and the rules for critical discussions. However, here I will argue that the conception of reasonableness that the pragma-dialecticians adopt in the philosophical estate, based on anti-dogmatism, assumption of fallibilism and willingness to engage in critical discussion, is too narrow to support the whole system of pragma-dialectical rules. What the philosophical estate requires is a broad and rich conception of excellent performance in argumentative practice, which then the rules of the critical discussion are intended to capture systematically in the theoretical estate. In my view, a virtue approach to argumentation is the ideal framework for such a philosophical ground. Virtues such as intellectual empathy, intellectual honesty, faith in reason, or recognition of reliable authority, point towards aspects of a philosophical conception of excellent arguing that are absent in the pragma-dialectical view of reasonableness. Finally, I will argue that what pragma-dialecticians call “second-order conditions” for a critical discussion are better understood as minimal argumentative virtue, a basic degree of virtue that arguers are required to possess in order to be prepared to participate in a fruitful critical discussion. The possession of such a basic degree of argumentative virtue is, I believe, what we mean when we characterise someone as reasonable.
dc.format	application/pdf	es
dc.format.extent	11	es
dc.identifier.citation	Topoi, 43(4), pp. 1325-1335.
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10071-6
dc.identifier.issn	Print: 0167-7411
dc.identifier.issn	Electronic: 1572-8749
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10201/158062
dc.language	eng	es
dc.publisher	Springer	es
dc.relation	Proyecto "Prácticas argumentativas y pragmática de las razones 2" (PID2022-136423NB-I00)	es
dc.relation.publisherversion	https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-024-10071-6
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es
dc.rights	Atribución 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Argumentative practice	es
dc.subject	Critical rationalism	es
dc.subject	Popper	es
dc.subject	Toulmin	es
dc.subject	Virtue argumentation theory	es
dc.subject.other	CDU::1 - Filosofía y psicología::16 - Lógica. Epistemología. Teoría del conocimiento	es
dc.title	Beyond reasonableness: argumentative virtues in pragma-dialectics	es
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	es
dspace.entity.type	Publication	es