Publication: Descartes y el pensamiento animal: acciones exteriores vs. acciones interiores
Authors
García Rodríguez, Sergio
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.315391
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
El presente artículo analiza los distintos argumentos que propone Descartes para negar la existencia de una mente en los animales y los compara con los ofrecidos para justificar la presencia de una mente en los humanos. Para ello se divide entre argumentos basados en las «acciones interiores» y argumentos fundados en las «acciones exteriores», esto es, entre aquellos que recurren a la experiencia subjetiva del pensamiento y aquellos que apelan a las conductas empíricamente observables. Finalmente se concluye que la argumentación cartesiana respecto al pensamiento animal sólo puede ofrecer una certeza moral.
This paper analyses the different arguments provided by Descartes so as to deny the existence of an animal mind and compares them with the reasons given to justify the presence of human mind. For this purpose, we will divide the argued reasons between arguments based on «interior actions» and «exterior actions», that is, those arguments that appeal to the subjective experience of thought and those that are based on empirically observable behaviours. Finally, it is evidenced that the Cartesian argumentation concerning animal thought is linked to a moral certainty.
This paper analyses the different arguments provided by Descartes so as to deny the existence of an animal mind and compares them with the reasons given to justify the presence of human mind. For this purpose, we will divide the argued reasons between arguments based on «interior actions» and «exterior actions», that is, those arguments that appeal to the subjective experience of thought and those that are based on empirically observable behaviours. Finally, it is evidenced that the Cartesian argumentation concerning animal thought is linked to a moral certainty.
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Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 79, 2020 pp. 161-176
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