Quantitative easing rules as a means to achieve optimal levels of structural reforms and government deficits in a monetary union

Campoy Miñarro, J. C.; Negrete Mediavilla, J. C.

Publication:
Quantitative easing rules as a means to achieve optimal levels of structural reforms and government deficits in a monetary union

dc.contributor.author	Campoy Miñarro, J. C.
dc.contributor.author	Negrete Mediavilla, J. C.
dc.contributor.department	Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
dc.date.accessioned	2023-09-23T22:10:47Z
dc.date.available	2023-09-23T22:10:47Z
dc.description	© 2023 The Authors. This document is made available under the CC-BY-NC 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc /4.0/ This document is the Accepted version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in The World Economy. To access the final edited and published work see DOI: 10.1111/twec.13460
dc.description.abstract	This paper uses a tractable game theory model to study the interactions of structural reforms and fiscal and monetary policies in the European Monetary Union (EMU). Considering the externalities that arise when interest rates have hit the lower bound and monetary policy is carried out through quantitative easing (QE), we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium is suboptimal when structural reforms and fiscal policy are implemented at a national level. Then, we prove that the optimal outcome cannot be obtained if structural reforms are dictated by a supranational institution. By contrast, we establish that the first best can be obtained either by a full-fledged fiscal union or a rule on QE. Given the practical difficulties that the first of these two solutions have encountered in the EMU, a rule over QE provides a clear, easier and more credible way to make structural reforms and fiscal deficits achieve the levels that maximise the union's welfare.
dc.format	application/pdf	es_ES
dc.format.extent	25
dc.identifier.citation	The World Economy.Vol. 46, Issue 9 p. 2755-2779
dc.identifier.issn	1467-9701
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10201/134163
dc.language	eng	es_ES
dc.relation.isreferencedby	ED_IDENTRADA=1171
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	*
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Central Bank Design	es_ES
dc.subject	Fiscal Policies	es_ES
dc.subject	Monetary Union	es_ES
dc.subject	Structural reforms	es_ES
dc.title	Quantitative easing rules as a means to achieve optimal levels of structural reforms and government deficits in a monetary union	es_ES
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	es_ES
dspace.entity.type	Publication	es