Publication: Hobbes y la ficción de la obligación política
Authors
Darat Guerra, Nicole
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Publisher
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones
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DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.449951
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
Abstract
En el artículo analizaremos el problema
de la obligación política en Hobbes, entendiendo
esta como una compulsión de carácter
moral a la obediencia a las leyes, por oposición a
un cálculo prudencial. Contra la lectura tradicional
que considera a Hobbes un teórico del consentimiento,
afirmaremos que este es secundario para
la obligación y que esta pretende sostenerse en
las leyes de naturaleza como preceptos de razón
prudencial. Partiendo del análisis de su respuesta
al Insensato1, concluiremos que los intentos de
fundamentar la obligación ceden ante el uso de la
coacción como estrategia dominante.
In this paper we will analyze the problem of political obligation in Hobbes, understanding this as a moral compulsion to obey the laws, in opposition to a prudential calculus. Against the traditional interpretation regarding Hobbes as a consent theorist, we will affirm that it plays a secondary role to obligation and that this is apparently sustained in laws of nature as precepts of prudential reason, oriented to self-preservation. Starting from the analysis of his answer to the Fool, we will conclude that attempts to justify obligation give in to the use of coercion as the dominant strategy.
In this paper we will analyze the problem of political obligation in Hobbes, understanding this as a moral compulsion to obey the laws, in opposition to a prudential calculus. Against the traditional interpretation regarding Hobbes as a consent theorist, we will affirm that it plays a secondary role to obligation and that this is apparently sustained in laws of nature as precepts of prudential reason, oriented to self-preservation. Starting from the analysis of his answer to the Fool, we will conclude that attempts to justify obligation give in to the use of coercion as the dominant strategy.
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Citation
Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, nº 88 (2023), pp. 153-166
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