Publication: Virtue and arguers
Authors
Gascón, José Ángel
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Publisher
Springer
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9321-8
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info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint
Description
©<2016>. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
This document is the Accepted, version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Topoi. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-015-9321-8
Abstract
Is a virtue approach in argumentation possible without committing the ad hominem fallacy? My answer is affirmative, provided that the object study of our theory is well delimited. My proposal is that a theory of argumentative virtue should not focus on argument appraisal, as has been assumed, but on those traits that make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative practices. An agent-based approach in argumentation should be developed, not in order to find better grounds for argument appraisal, but to gain insight into argumentative habits and excellence. This way we can benefit from what a virtue argumentation theory really has to offer.
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Citation
Topoi 35, 441–450 (2016)
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