Publication: Similarity-based cognition: radical enactivism meets cognitive neuroscience
Authors
Segundo Ortin, Miguel ; Hutto, Daniel D.
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Publisher
Springer
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DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02505-1
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Description
© Springer Nature B.V. 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. This document is the Accepted version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in Synthese. To access the final edited and published work see https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02505-1
Abstract
Similarity-based cognition is commonplace. It occurs whenever an agent or system exploits the similarities that hold between two or more items — e.g., events, processes, objects, and so on— in order to perform some
cognitive task. This kind of cognition is of special interest to cognitive neuroscientists. This paper explicates how similarity-based cognition can be understood through the lens of radical enactivism and why doing so has
advantages over its representationalist rival, which posits the existence of structural representations or S-representations. Specifically, it is argued that there are problems both with accounting for the content of S-representations and with understanding how neurally-based structural similarities can work as representations (even if contentless) in guiding intelligent behavior. Finally, with these clarifications in place, it is revealed how radically enactivism can commit to an account of similarity-based cognition in its understanding of
neurodynamics.
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Citation
Synthese (2021) 198 (Suppl 1):S5–S23
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