Browsing by Subject "Say on pay"

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    Managerial discretion, say on pay, and CEO compensation
    (Emerald Publishing Limited, 2020-09-07) Baixauli Soler, Juan Samuel; Lozano Reina, Gabriel; Sánchez Marín, Gregorio; Organización de Empresas y Finanzas; Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Organización de Empresas y Finanzas
    Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of managerial discretion on the effectiveness of say on pay (SOP) as a governance mechanism. This goal covers an important gap since the issue of how effective SOP is in promoting more aligned compensation has proved somewhat controversial. Design/methodology/approach This empirical research opted for a panel methodology for the period 2003–2017, using a sample of large UK listed-companies (specifically, 3,445 firm-year observations). Data were obtained from several sources (Manifest Ltd, BoardEx, Worldscope, Factset Ownership and DataStream). Findings Results show that managerial discretion plays an important role in the effectiveness of SOP as a mechanism for increasing aligned CEO compensation. While individual discretion (latitude of objectives) exerts a negative effect, contextual discretion (latitude of action) increases SOP effectiveness. The global effect of managerial discretion is positive when there is high level of both individual and contextual discretion. Originality/value This empirical study provides evidence concerning an emerging topic in the literature regarding the impact of SOP as a shareholder activism mechanism of corporate governance on executive compensation. By taking managerial discretion into consideration as a relevant moderating factor, it also offers a better explanation of SOP effectiveness as a governance mechanism.
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    Publication
    Open Access
    Say on Pay Effectiveness, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Ceo Compensation Alignment
    (SAGE Publications, 2017-07-31) Sánchez Marín, Gregorio; Lozano Reina, Gabriel; Baixauli Soler, J. Samuel; Lucas Pérez, María Encarnación; Organización de Empresas y Finanzas; Facultades, Departamentos, Servicios y Escuelas::Departamentos de la UMU::Organización de Empresas y Finanzas
    Say on pay (SOP) is a relatively new governance mechanism that allows shareholders to pronounce on the suitability on executives’ compensation. The literature has mainly examined SOP effects on Anglo Saxon contexts of corporate governance, reporting mixed results and highlighting the need to deepen our understanding of its real impact, as well as its interactions with other mechanisms of governance. Concerning these gaps, the present research analyzes the effectiveness of SOP as a mechanism for aligning CEO compensation in the context of Spanish listed companies – a good representative model of continental European systems of corporate governance–. It also examines the moderating effect of board monitoring and ownership structure. Using panel data and linear regression methodologies on a set of companies from 2013 to 2016, the results show that SOP generally increases the alignment of CEO compensation, although its effectiveness is reduced in companies with overcompensated CEOs and in owner-managed companies.