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  1. Home
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Browsing by Subject "Reductionism"

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    Against smallism and localism
    (University of Białystok, 2015-07-24) Chemero, Anthony; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
    The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of “smallism” and “localism”. We criticize these ideals and articulate a case in favor of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work.
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    El embrollo causal del naturalismo biológico
    (Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones, ) Arias Domínguez, Asier
    La ontología de lo mental del naturalismo biológico depende decisivamente de la noción de causalidad. No obstante, Searle no incardina dicha noción en su ontología en diálogo con la literatura científica y filosófica relevante, sino antes bien orientado por cierta suerte de verosimilitud intuitiva. Sobre el trasfondo de la ontología general de Mario Bunge, discutimos las dificultades derivadas del somero tratamiento searleano de la causalidad, poniendo el foco en las relativas a su intento de presentar la relación de emergencia en términos causales y de postular, por tanto, a las propiedades emergentes como candidatas a relata causales.
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    La investigación del entorno como estrategia de educación para la paz
    (Universidad de Zaragoza, Asociación Universitaria de Formación del Profesorado (AUFOP), 1990) Rodríguez Rojo, Martín
    Después de hacer una crítica a los reduccionismos que se han dado en la Historia acerca de la educación para la paz, se describe una concepción integral de la educación pacifista, el edu-pacifismo. Se razona por qué desde esta postura se concibe a la investigación del entorno como un método positivo de educación para la paz, indicando las condiciones que deberá poseer y los pasos de un modelo utilizable dentro de esta estrategia metodológica.
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    Patterns in Cognitive Phenomena and Pluralism of Explanatory Styles
    (Wiley, 2019) Potochnik, Angela; Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía
    Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. [online first, 2019]

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