Browsing by Subject "Cognitive science"

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
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    Consciousness and cognition in plants
    (Wiley, 2021-09-23) Segundo-Ortin, Miguel; Calvo, Paco; Filosofía
    Unlike animal behavior, behavior in plants is traditionally assumed to be completely determined either genetically or environmentally. Under this assumption, plants are usually considered to be noncognitive organisms. This view nonetheless clashes with a growing body of empirical research that shows that many sophisticated cognitive capabilities traditionally assumed to be exclusive to animals are exhibited by plants too. Yet, if plants can be considered cognitive, even in a minimal sense, can they also be considered conscious? Some authors defend that the quest for plant consciousness is worth pursuing, under the premise that sentience can play a role in facilitating plant's sophisticated behavior. The goal of this article is not to provide a positive argument for plant cognition and consciousness, but to invite a constructive, empirically informed debate about it. After reviewing the empirical literature concerning plant cognition, we introduce the reader to the emerging field of plant neurobiology. Research on plant electrical and chemical signaling can help shed light into the biological bases for plant sentience. To conclude, we shall present a series of approaches to scientifically investigate plant consciousness. In sum, we invite the reader to consider the idea that if consciousness boils down to some form of biological adaptation, we should not exclude a priori the possibility that plants have evolved their own phenomenal experience of the world.
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    Interação e atribuição de estados mentais: aspectos sociais da psicologia do senso Comum
    (Sociedad Filosófica del Uruguay (SFU), 2012-05) Sanches de Oliveira, Guilherme; Filosofía; Caorsi, C.; Navia, R.; Melogno, P.
    Matthew Ratcliffe defende que a Psicologia do Senso Comum é incompatível com nosso entendimento interpessoal ordinário, o qual ele diz ser mais fundamentalmente interativo e interpretativo de acordo com as normas sociais do ambiente compartilhado do que baseado em atribuições de estados mentais intencionais. Neste trabalho eu examino a proposta de Ratcliffe, propondo que sua rejeição da leitura mental não é justificada; embora seja certo que a ação coordenada pode decorrer de uma mera compreensão contextual, há casos em que não existe entendimento interpessoal exatamente por falha em leitura mental, assim evidenciando a importância de atribuições de estados mentais.