Browsing by Subject "Audit commitee"

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
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    CAE Remuneration and Financial Reporting Quality
    (2021) Alzeban, Abdulaziz
    This paper reports on a study exploring the relationship between the fixed remuneration paid to the Chief Auditing Executive (CAE), and the subsequent financial reporting quality (FRQ). The study argues from the viewpoint that a strategy of compensation provided on the basis of company performance is detrimental to FRQ, and that when the CAE receives fixed remuneration, there is less threat to internal audit (IA) objectivity, and hence, greater FRQ as proxied by accruals quality. Data are obtained via a survey questionnaire, and information offered within annual reports. The findings indicate that when the CAE is compensated according to company performance, objectivity is reduced, with the consequent outcome that FRQ is impaired. Furthermore, when CAE remuneration and compensation are approved by the audit committee, rather than by the CEO, FRQ is higher. Evidence that the effects of IA objectivity are eliminated when the CEO is involved in approving CAE remuneration and compensation is also found. The study provides insights into the question of whether CAE remuneration enhances IA objectivity, and in doing so is of interest to audit committees with responsibility in that direction. Two different estimation methods are used as a means of confirming the robustness of these results
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    Open Access
    Does audit committee financial expertise actually improves information readability?
    (Universidad de Murcia, Servicio de Publicaciones, 2022) Alcaide-Ruiz, María Dolores; Bravo-Urquiza, Francisco
    This paper investigates the relationship between audit committee financial expertise, particularly considering specific accounting financial expertise, and the readability of management reports. Additionally, this study also examines whether the effect of financial experts is moderated by the intensity of the audit committee’s activity. The dataset for directors’ characteristics is hand-collected as are the management reports. The sample is composed of Spanish listed firms for the period 2013-2015. The results show a negative association between financial expertise, especially accounting financial expertise, and the readability of management reports. In addition, this association is accentuated with higher number of audit committees’ meetings. This evidence stimulates the debate on the advantages of having members with financial expertise in the audit committee. Otherwise, the use of contextual approaches in further studies regarding the role of directors is recommended. In addition, this could help regulators and professionals to guide their requirements and recommendations about directors’ qualifications.